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Bayh–Dole Beyond Borders
Daniel J. Hemel1 & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette2
DRAFT—2/11/17
U.S. taxpayers provide over $100 billion each year in direct
support for scientific research through grants and government labs.
Under the Bayh–Dole Act, grant recipients can obtain patents on
inventions that result from this public support. This framework has been
replicated in many other countries, though it has been widely criticized
here and abroad. The most salient charge against Bayh–Dole is that it
forces consumers to “pay twice” for patented products—first through the
tax system and again when the patentee charges a supracompetitive
price. Supporters of Bayh–Dole counter that patents promote
commercialization of inventions generated by government grantees, but
it is doubtful that the commercialization benefits can justify the Act’s
present scope.
One important feature of Bayh–Dole, however, has been
overlooked in the debate thus far—a feature that arises from the globalpublic-good nature of knowledge. Unless government grantees can
obtain patent protection for inventions generated by government-funded
research, the United States would have no practical way of internalizing
the positive externalities conferred on consumers in other countries who
use products produced through U.S. taxpayer-financed research. Put
differently, the charge that Bayh–Dole forces U.S. consumers to “pay
twice” misses the point that eliminating some Bayh–Dole patents would
permit non-U.S. consumers—in particular, consumers in other richworld countries—to avoid paying at all. By allowing the United States as
a whole to internalize some benefits that federally funded inventions
bring to consumers in other rich-world countries, the Bayh–Dole regime
arguably yields attractive distributional effects and plausibly leads to
greater direct research support within the United States.
To be sure, this “internalization theory” of Bayh–Dole was not
the rationale upon which sponsors of the Act relied. And like
commercialization theory, internalization theory cannot justify the Act’s
present scope. Rather than relying on internalization theory to defend
Bayh–Dole, we highlight ways in which this novel theory can inform
debates over Bayh–Dole reform. Internalization theory suggests that
patents on products generated by government-sponsored research have a
role to play in a global marketplace—although not quite the role that
they play under the status quo.

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
Assistant Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.
We are grateful to researchers at the World Intellectual Property Organization Economics
and Statistics Division for supplying data on global university patenting. For helpful comments
on earlier drafts, thanks to Mark Lemley and two anonymous reviewers.
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Introduction
Universities, national laboratories, and other recipients of federal
funding for research and development receive over $100 billion each year from
U.S. taxpayers.1 Under the Bayh–Dole Act of 1980, grant recipients can patent
inventions stemming from this public support.2 Proponents say that Bayh–Dole
has been a success beyond the “wildest dreams” of its drafters,3 creating
hundreds of thousands (or millions) of jobs4 and “sav[ing]—literally—millions
of lives.”5 One prominent columnist has placed Bayh–Dole among the “three
policies that gave us the jobs economy.”6 The Economist magazine—a
publication not generally prone to hyperbole—has gone a step further, calling
Bayh–Dole “[p]ossibly the most inspired piece of legislation to be enacted in
America over the past half-century.”7
Bayh–Dole’s detractors, for their part,8 attack the Act from many
angles. We focus here on two lines of criticism. The first takes the perspective
of consumers and taxpayers within the United States. The argument is that it is
inefficient—and unfair—to force U.S. taxpayers to “pay twice” for patented
products: once when they fund the initial grant, and again when they pay
NAT’L SCI. FOUND., SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2016, at 4-29 tbl. 4-3,
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2016/nsb20161/uploads/1/nsb20161.pdf.
2 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2012). The lesser-known Stevenson–Wydler Act sets similar
technology transfer rules for federal laboratories. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3714.
3 Gene Quinn, Bayh–Dole: A Success Beyond Wildest Dreams, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 15, 2013),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/09/15/bayh-dole-a-success-beyond-wildest-dreams.
4 See Birch Bayh & Joseph P. Allen, School Power: The Case for Keeping Innovation in the Hands of
Universities, ATLANTIC (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012
/04/school-power-the-case-for-keeping-innovation-in-the-hands-of-universities/255751;
BIOTECHNOLOGY
INDUS.
ORG.,
THE
ECONOMIC
CONTRIBUTION
OF
UNIVERSITY/NONPROFIT INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1996–2010, at 3 (2012),
http://www.bio.org/articles/economic-contribution-universitynonprofit-inventions-unitedstates-1996-2010.
5
Betsy de Parry, Why Bipartisanship Matters, IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 3, 2012),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/11/03/why-bipartisanship-matters.
6 Amity Shales, Commentary, Three Policies that Gave Us the Jobs Economy, WALL ST. J., Oct.
17, 2011, at A17. The other two, according to Shales, are the preferential tax treatment for
capital gains and the laws allowing pension plans to invest in start-ups.
7 Opinion, Innovation’s Golden Goose, ECONOMIST TECH. Q., Dec. 14, 2002, at 3. This oftquoted statement almost certainly qualifies as hyperbole, however. Even Bayh–Dole’s most
ardent backers might balk before placing it above the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, the landmark environmental legislation of the 1970s, and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990. One might also wonder whether the editors of The Economist
would stand by the statement today, given the magazine’s more pessimistic current view of the
patent system overall. See Time To Fix Patents, ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 2015, at 9.
8 Many critics of the Bayh-Dole Act argue for reform rather than repeal, though several
prominent voices—including the venture capitalist Marc Andreessen and the late bestselling
author Michael Crichton—have called for outright repeal. See MICHAEL CRICHTON, NEXT
536 (2006); James Pethokoukis, 16 Ideas from Marc Andreessen for a More Dynamic US Economy,
AEIDEAS (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.aei.org/publication/16-ideas-marc-andreessendynamic-us-economy.
1
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supracompetitive prices for the patented product.9 A second line of attack
highlights the effect of Bayh–Dole (and university patenting more broadly) on
the developing world.10 Federal grant recipients may seek patent protection
under the laws of any jurisdiction,11 and U.S. universities have patented lifesaving treatments in developing countries.12 Access-to-medicine advocates are
concerned that such patents may drive prices of essential products out of reach
for some consumers in the developing world.13
In our view, both of these critiques have considerable force. And yet
there is a significant segment of the market for patented products to which
neither argument applies: consumers in other rich-world countries. When a
website in Germany pays a higher price to its server because the server uses a
technology covered by a patent granted to MIT,14 the website owner is not
paying “twice” for the technology because the website owner never paid a first
time: U.S. taxpayers, not German taxpayers, provided the funding for the

See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship, Ownership,
and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1194 (2000); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research
and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L.
REV. 1663, 1666 (1996); Bhaven N. Sampat & Frank R. Lichtenberg, What Are the Respective
Roles of the Public and Private Sectors in Pharmaceutical Innovation?, 30 HEALTH AFF. 332, 333 (2011);
cf. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2201
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that there must be some compensating benefit of Bayh–
Dole because otherwise, “Why should the public have to pay twice for the same invention?”).
10 Not all university patents are Bayh–Dole patents, and vice versa, although there is
significant overlap. See NAT’L SCI. FOUND., supra note 1, at 4-29 tbl. 4-3 (noting that
universities receive over half their R&D funding from the federal government, and ninety-five
percent of their R&D funding from other government and nonprofit sources). We focus on
university patenting for simplicity, but the benefit we will describe is more broadly applicable
to federally funded research at other institutions (including other nonprofit organizations, forprofit firms, and national laboratories) and to non-federally funded research at universities.
11 The text of the Bayh–Dole Act does not distinguish between U.S. and foreign patents, see
35 U.S.C. § 202(a), and the regulations implementing Bayh–Dole make quite clear that
grantees can seek patent protection in foreign jurisdictions as well as the United States. See 37
C.F.R. § 401.14(a), cl. (b) (setting forth the general rule that a grantee “may retain the entire
right, title, and interest throughout the world to each subject invention”).
12 See Bhaven Sampat, Academic Patents and Access to Medicines in Developing Countries, 99 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 9 (2009).
13 See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach
for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031 (2005); Beirne Roose-Snyder & Megan
K. Doyle, The Global Health Licensing Program: A New Model for Humanitarian Licensing at the
University Level, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 281 (2009). A related critique is that developing countries
ought not adopt their own regimes modeled after Bayh–Dole. See Anthony D. So et al., Is
Bayh–Dole Good for Developing Countries? Lessons from the U.S. Experience, 6 PLOS BIO. 2078 (2008).
14
See German Patent No. DE 699 15 333 T3 (filed July 14, 1999),
http://www.google.com/patents/DE69915333T3; U.S. Patent No. 6,108,703 (filed May 19,
1999) (corresponding U.S. patent); Mor Harchol-Balter, Tom Leighton & Daniel Lewin,
Resource Discovery in Distributed Networks, PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL ACM
SYMPOSIUM ON PRINCIPLES OF DISTRIBUTING COMPUTING, May 1999, at 229 (noting
support for this invention from the U.S. Army); see also Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai
Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2115 (2014) (describing the technology).
9
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research at MIT.15 Meanwhile, the global distributive justice concerns that
come to mind when, say, patients in sub-Saharan Africa pay higher prices for a
first-generation HIV treatment patented by Yale16 are less compelling when
patients in Norway pay more for a hair loss treatment patented by the
University of Central Florida.17 Indeed, in the latter context, allowing U.S.
universities to claim patent protection (as Bayh–Dole does) might seem attractive
from a distributive justice perspective: why should taxpayers in the United
States pay for the development of the treatment while beneficiaries in (much
richer18) Norway pay nothing at all?19

To be clear, one might still argue that the combination of federal grants and Bayh-Dole
patent revenues results in “excessive” rewards for knowledge good producers. By “excessive,”
we mean that the reward exceeds the amount needed to induce a potential innovator to pursue
a project. The social costs of excessive rewards are fourfold. First, insofar as rewards are funded
through behavior-distorting taxes (such as taxes on income or consumption), then excessive
rewards distort behavior more than the minimum degree necessary to produce the
corresponding innovation benefits. Second, and similarly, insofar as rewards come in the form
of patent rents, then excessive rewards result in greater deadweight loss than necessary to
motivate the innovator. Third, if rewards exceed the social benefits of innovation, then
excessive rewards might induce innovators to pursue socially wasteful projects. And fourth,
even insofar as excessive rewards amount to pure transfers from taxpayers or consumers to
innovators, then excessive rewards might shift resources from individuals with higher marginal
utilities of income to individuals with lower marginal utilities of income, thus reducing overall
welfare.
Our argument here is that U.S. public and private investment in knowledge production
might fall (further) below the level that maximizes global welfare if the U.S. federal government
and U.S. firms did not have the opportunity to capture a portion of the benefits that U.S.generated knowledge goods confer on foreign consumers—an opportunity that the Bayh-Dole
regime facilitates. Of course, if one believes that the current level of U.S. public and private
investment in knowledge production is supraoptimal, then that might be a reason to oppose a
regime such as Bayh-Dole that facilitates further investment. Moreover, our argument is
explicitly not that the internalization theory can justify U.S. patents for federally funded
research. On the latter point, see note 120 and accompanying text.
16 See U.S. Patent No. 4,978,655 col. 1 l. 8–10 (filed Dec. 17, 1986) (noting support from the
National Institutes of Health); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make a
Drug? Follow-on Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 299, 309 (2010) (describing how Yale helped reduce the price of this drug in sub-Saharan
Africa from over $1600 per year to $55 per year).
17 See European Patent No. EP 2 326 330 B1 (filed Sept. 16, 2009) (designating Norway,
among others, as a contracting state). This does not mean that concerns about patents on HIV
treatments in developing countries are misguided, just that this concern has overshadowed the
effect of Bayh–Dole patents in other wealthy countries, even though the latter have a larger
financial impact.
18
See GNI Per Capita, Atlas Method (Current US$), WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD (last visited Aug. 29, 2016)
(reporting that in 2015, the gross national income per capita computed by the Atlas method
was $93,820 in Norway and $54,960 in the United States).
19 To be sure, some consumers abroad are U.S. taxpayers: the United States requires its
citizens to pay tax on worldwide income, even if they live abroad. See 26 U.S.C. § 61 (2012)
(“[G]ross income means all income from whatever source derived . . . .”); Income from Abroad Is
Taxable, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Income-from-Abroadis-Taxable (last updated Nov. 10, 2015). We address overseas Americans in greater detail
below. Infra note 123 and accompanying text.
15

2/11/17

BAYH–DOLE BEYOND BORDERS

6

This overlooked international dimension of the Bayh–Dole regime may
provide a novel—though partial—justification for allowing universities to
obtain patents on publicly supported inventions. In addition to yielding
arguably attractive distributional consequences, such patents may also increase
efficiency: By allowing the U.S. federal government and U.S. firms to
internalize some of the benefits that federally funded inventions bring to
foreign consumers, Bayh–Dole may induce higher levels of U.S. public and
private spending on research in the first place. Universities and other
nonprofits are required to reinvest Bayh–Dole patent revenues in science
research and education,20 and those universities with successful technology
transfer programs have been able to devote substantial resources to new
research projects.21 It is also possible that lobbying by universities and their
domestic licensees who benefit from Bayh–Dole patent rents could cause
Congress to increase research grant appropriations. This theory applies with
similar force to other countries considering the enactment (or refinement) of
Bayh–Dole-like laws: Patents on publicly supported inventions allow the
nation-state that sponsors the research to capture a larger share of the global
benefits generated by its efforts, with potentially positive effects on the overall
level of public R&D funding. We call this the “internalization theory” of Bayh–
Dole, and as far as we know, it is an aspect of the Bayh–Dole regime that has
gone unmentioned in the literature thus far.
Our primary goal here is to describe the internalization theory, but we
also seek to identify the questions that must be answered to evaluate its
strength. For example: How often do federally funded research institutions seek
patent protection in foreign jurisdictions? How much of this overseas patenting
activity occurs in high-income countries and how much occurs in middle- and
low-income countries? And when foreign sales of a product that resulted from
federally funded R&D generate supracompetitive profits, where do these
profits go? We offer a first cut at answering these questions, but we do not think
there is yet sufficient evidence to offer a full-throated defense of the claim that
Bayh–Dole actually serves a valuable benefit-internalization function on either
efficiency or distributive grounds. Rather, we hope to lay the groundwork for
universities and other Bayh–Dole proponents who are in a better position to
bolster this claim empirically.
Our analysis proceeds in four short parts. Part I reviews the uneasy case
for patents on federally funded inventions. Part II sets out the internalization
theory and describes how Bayh–Dole may allow the United States to capture a
portion of the benefits that federally funded R&D brings to consumers in other
(and especially other rich-world) countries. Part III presents new data on the
reach of university patents beyond the United States, with a particular focus on
patents in industrialized nations that are not the focus of the “paying twice”

35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(C).
See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions About WARF’s Purpose and Functions, WIS. ALUMNI
RESEARCH FOUND., http://www.warf.org/about-us/faqs/facts-about-warf-s-purpose-andfunctions.cmsx (last visited Mar. 17, 2016) (“Since its inception, [the University of Wisconsin’s
technology transfer foundation] has provided $2.3 billion in cumulative direct grants.”).
20
21
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critique or the access-to-medicines movement. Finally, Part IV explores how
internalization theory should affect the ongoing Bayh–Dole debate in the
United States, as well as debates in other countries where governments are
considering similar regimes.

I. The Uneasy Case for Bayh–Dole Patents
Prior to 1980, federal agencies maintained inconsistent policies as to
whether recipients of research grants could take title to inventions that sprung
from federally funded projects.22 This uncertainty, as well as increases in the
costs of bringing pharmaceuticals to market,23 led Congress to pass the Bayh–
Dole Act of 1980.24 The stated goals of the Act include promoting “utilization
of inventions arising from federally supported research” and “collaboration
between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including
universities.”25
To accomplish these goals, the Bayh–Dole Act allows contractors such
as universities that receive federal grants to “retain title to” (i.e., obtain patents
on) inventions created under those grants.26 Once university patent
administrators learn of a federally funded invention, a university has two
months to notify the agency and two years to decide whether to retain title, and
then another one year to file a patent—with shorter deadlines if the inventor
has made any public disclosure (e.g., by publishing the invention) that limits the
period of patentability.27
The agency may file any patents that a contractor chooses not to
pursue, including patent applications in other countries.28 Thus, if the

22 See Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1671–91; Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J.
1, 30–32 (2013). As these and other scholars have explained, universities often sought patents
on federally funded inventions before Bayh–Dole, and an important motivation for the Act was
to standardize these practices. See id.; see also DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND
INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY–INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND
AFTER THE BAYH–DOLE ACT 1 (2004) (describing evidence that “the Bayh–Dole Act was one
of several factors that contributed to the growth of patenting and licensing by U.S. universities
during the 1980s and 1990s” in that it “provided a strong congressional endorsement” of
university patenting “and simplified the formerly complex administrative process through
which U.S. universities gained title to the intellectual property resulting from publicly funded
research”).
23 Roberto Mazzoleni, Before Bayh–Dole: Public Research Funding, Patents, and Pharmaceutical
Innovation (1945–1965), 20 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 721, 724 (2011).
24 Bayh–Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (20012)).
25 35 U.S.C. § 200.
26 35 U.S.C. § 202(a). Funding agreements may provide otherwise only in a limited number
of circumstances. Id. The default right to take title applies “throughout the world.” 37 C.F.R.
§ 401.14(a), cl. (b).
27 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(a), cl. (c); see 35 U.S.C. § 202(c). For details on the one-year grace
period for filing a patent after a public disclosure such as a publication, see 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
28 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(3), (d); 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(a), cl. (d).
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contractor files a patent application in the United States but not the United
Kingdom, the agency may file in the United Kingdom. If a contractor chooses
to patent, “the Federal agency shall have a nonexclusive, nontransferable,
irrevocable, paid-up license” to the patents, and any U.S. patent application
must specify “that the Government has certain rights in the invention.”29
Agencies may further “require periodic reporting on the utilization” of the
invention.30 As a matter of law, agencies also may exercise “march-in” rights to
issue additional licenses to the invention if the contractor is not taking
“effective steps to achieve practical application” or “to alleviate health or safety
needs.”31 In practice, however, march-in rights have never been exercised.32
Universities are required to reinvest their patent rents in research. The
statute specifies that any grant agreement must contain a “requirement that the
balance of any royalties or income earned by the contractor with respect to
subject inventions, after payment of expenses (including payments to inventors)
incidental to administration of subject inventions, be utilized for the support of
science research or education.”33 The Bayh–Dole Act also includes an explicit
preference for federally funded inventions to be manufactured in the United
States. Any exclusive licensee of a Bayh–Dole patent must agree “that any
products embodying the subject invention or produced through the use of the
subject invention will be manufactured substantially in the United States”
unless domestic manufacture is infeasible.34
The justification for the Bayh–Dole Act generally offered by its
supporters is materially different from the standard justification for the patent
system overall. As Rebecca Eisenberg writes in her landmark analysis of the
Bayh–Dole Act, “a standard instrumental argument” for patents is that they
provide “incentives to invest in the costly and risky enterprise of making
inventions,” but this argument “loses much of its force in the case of inventions
made with public funding” where taxpayers have already “absorbed the risk
that nothing will come of [their] investment.”35 (This is the foundation of the
29 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4), (6); 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(a), cl. (b). Contractors often fail to meet this
requirement, without apparent sanction. See Arti K. Rai & Bhaven N. Sampat, Accountability in
Patenting of Federally Funded Research, 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 953, 954–55 (2012).
30 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(5); 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(a), cl. (h).
31 35 U.S.C. § 203(a); 37 C.F.R. §§ 401.6, 401.14(a), cl. (j).
32 See Ryan Whalen, Note, The Bayh–Dole Act & Public Rights in Federally Funded Inventions: Will
the Agencies Ever Go Marching in?, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 1083 (2015).
33 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(C). For the standard contract language, see 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(a),
cl. (k)(3).
34 35 U.S.C. § 204; 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(a), cl. (i).
35 Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1668; see also Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post
Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129 (2004) (“The standard
justification for intellectual property is ex ante . . . .”). While the standard argument loses much
of its force in the context of publicly funded innovations, the argument does not lose all of its
force. For example, even when a federal grant fully covers out-of-pocket costs, it may not
compensate the researcher fully for the opportunity cost of her time. A researcher who devotes
years of work to a project at below-market pay does in that sense absorb part of the risk that
nothing will come of her time investment, and the possibility of patent rewards may incentivize
her to make that investment. On the other hand, there is no empirical evidence that Bayh–
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“paying twice” critique: if U.S. taxpayers are already funding university
research to the optimal level, then adding patent rights to the incentive
package gives an excessive reward.36) Instead of relying on theories based on ex
ante incentives, Eisenberg writes, Bayh–Dole advocates “shift the focus from
the initial costs of making an invention to the subsequent costs of developing an
existing invention into a commercial product.”37 The “commercialization
theory” posits that the Bayh–Dole framework facilitates cooperation between
university researchers and the private-sector firms capable of bringing the
products of university research to market. The idea that patents are needed for
commercialization is the first goal listed in the statutory text,38 is pervasive
throughout the legislative history,39 and has been noted by both the Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit.40 Commentators have focused on this theory
when defending Bayh–Dole, pointing to the number of patent licenses and
start-up firms that the Act has produced.41

Dole spurs federally funded researchers to produce more or better inventions, and it is even
theoretically possible that the financial incentives of Bayh–Dole could lead to less innovation if
they “crowd out” intrinsic rewards. Cf. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS:
HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 92–98 (2006). Our
argument here does not depend on which of these theories is correct. For further discussion of
this and other possible justifications for Bayh–Dole patents, see Ian Ayres & Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, A Market Test for Bayh–Dole Patents, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 271 (2017).
36 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
37 Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1669. Note that “ex post theories” such as the
commercialization theory are not limited to the Bayh–Dole context. See Ayres & Ouellette,
supra note 35 (manuscript at 13-15) (reviewing literature); see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature
and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977); Staff of Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks & Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., An Economic
Review of the Patent System, Study No. 15, at 36 (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by Professor
Fritz Machlup).
38 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2012) (“It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent
system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or
development . . . .”).
39 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3 (1980) (“[T]he existing melange of 26
different agency policies on vesting of patent rights in government funded research is replaced
by a single, uniform national policy designed to cut down on bureaucracy and encourage
private industry to utilize government funded inventions through the commitment of the risk
capital necessary to develop such inventions to the point of commercial application.”); 124
CONG. REC. 29,122 (1978) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (expressing concern about the “[h]undreds
of valuable medical, energy, and other technical discoveries” that were “sitting unused”).
40 See Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., 131 S. Ct. 2188,
2192 (2011) (“In 1980, Congress passed the Bayh–Dole Act to ‘promote the utilization of
inventions arising from federally supported research’ . . . .” (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 200)); In re
Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 516 F.3d 1003, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The purpose of the Bayh–
Dole Act is as an incentive, not a bar, to university-industry collaboration and commercial
development through licensing . . . .”).
41 See, e.g., Chester G. Moore, Killing the Bayh–Dole Act’s Golden Goose, 8 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 151, 155 (2006); Innovation’s Golden Goose, supra note 7; Joseph Allen, Bayh–Dole
Under March-in Assault: Can it Hold out?, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 21, 2016),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/01/21/bayh-dole-under-march-in-assault-can-it-holdout/id=65118.
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A typical example cited by advocates of the commercialization theory is
that of a cancer researcher at a university whose work is funded by a federal
grant; the researcher develops a cutting-edge therapy but cannot possibly
afford to pay the millions of dollars required to put the therapy through clinical
trials. So the researcher obtains a patent on the therapy and licenses it to a
pharmaceutical company on an exclusive basis. The pharmaceutical company
pays for the clinical trials and brings the therapy to market, improving the lives
of patients and reaping profits that the company shares with the university and
the researcher. Bayh–Dole is an essential link on this causal chain, say its
supporters, because if the researcher could not have obtained the patent, then
she could not have licensed the invention to the pharmaceutical company on
an exclusive basis. And the pharmaceutical company would not have spent
millions of dollars on clinical trials if, once those trials were completed, any
other pharmaceutical company could copy the therapy and sell it as a generic
product.42 Note that this “commercialization theory” is focused on increasing
dissemination of federally funded inventions, not increasing their initial supply.
The evidence surrounding the commercialization theory is mixed. One
study found that almost a third of scientifically novel drugs are discovered by
universities and then transferred to pharmaceutical and biotechnology
companies for commercialization.43 This data point might suggest that that
Bayh–Dole plays an important role in bringing inventions from the lab to the
market (although it is unclear how many of these novel drugs would have been
commercialized absent Bayh–Dole). On the other hand, data collected by the
Association of University Technology Managers indicates that over sixty
percent of patent licenses issued by universities are nonexclusive.44 That
statistic calls into question the commercialization-theory account, in which the
promise of exclusivity is what incentivizes a private-sector firm to invest in

42 See, e.g., de Parry, supra note 5 (“Have you or a loved one taken Tamoxifen or Herceptin
for breast cancer? How about Revlimid for multiple myeloma? Bexxar for non-Hodgkin
lymphoma? Gleevec for chronic myelogenous leukemia? Did Neulasta ever keep you safe from
infection while undergoing chemotherapy? Then you have benefited from bipartisanship,
because these and nearly 200 other drugs are available today as a result of the 96th Congress
passing a little-known bill that . . . became known as the Bayh–Dole Act.”). On the need for
sufficient patent life to incentivize clinical trials, see Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the
Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 545–47 (2009). Of course, pharmaceutical
companies also benefit significantly from nonpatent incentives such as regulatory exclusivity,
tax preferences, and the direct federal grants that are the focus of this paper. See Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpatent Innovation Incentives, 5 UC IRVINE L. REV. 1115,
1128–37 (2015).
43 Robert Kneller, The Importance of New Companies for Drug Discovery: Origins of a Decade of New
Drugs, 9 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 867, 896 tbl.1 (2010); see also Sampat &
Lichtenberg, supra note 9, at 334–35 (reporting that of the 155 drugs granted “priority review”
by the FDA from 1988 to 2005—reserved for “drugs that offer major advances in treatment, or
provide a treatment where no adequate therapy exists”—seventeen percent had a patent
assigned to the government or acknowledging government support, and two-thirds at least
indirectly relied on government-funded research).
44 Statistics Access for Technology Transfer (STATT) Database, ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH.
MANAGERS,
http://www.autm.net/resources-surveys/research-reports-databases/stattdatabase-(1).
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commercializing inventions coming out of publicly funded labs. As Eisenberg
writes, “nonexclusive licenses do little or nothing to give licensees an advantage
over their competitors and thus are unlikely to enhance the profitability of
product development.”45 To be sure, one should be cautious about inferring
that all nonexclusive licenses have no commercialization value: for instance,
universities might maximize profits through cartel rather than monopoly
arrangements.46 Yet at the very least, the pervasiveness of nonexclusive licenses
creates a chink in the commercialization theory’s armor. And a number of
prominent innovation scholars—including Arti Rai, Suzanne Scotchmer,
Bhaven Sampat, and Mark Lemley, have echoed Eisenberg’s critique: the
validity of commercialization theory depends on the technology in question,
and it is not convincing for many Bayh–Dole patents.47
In several high-profile cases of Bayh–Dole patents that ultimately ended
up in litigation, the commercialization-theory account seems to carry little
force. For example, Boston University made headlines—and earned the label
of “patent troll”—by successfully suing thirty of the largest tech firms over a
nonexclusively licensed patent on blue LEDs,48 which was the product of
research partially funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF).49 Given
the rapid adoption of this technology without exclusivity, Boston University’s
Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1710.
For example, if a licensee firm thinks a university is profit maximizing, it might accept a
nonexclusive license for a percentage of its profits on the condition that the university demand
the same percentage from any future licensee. A purely profit-motivated university would have
an incentive to grant a second nonexclusive license only if the first firm turns out to be bad at
commercializing the invention (because a fixed percentage of monopoly profits is greater than
that same percentage of duopoly profits). We are unaware of universities that have followed
such a strategy, rather than making nonexclusive licenses available to all interested parties.
47 See Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of
Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 120, 135 (1999); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh–Dole
Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter/Spring 2003, at 289, 300;
Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property—When Is It the Best Incentive Mechanism for S&T Data and
Information?, in NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA AND
INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 15 (Julie M. Esanu & Paul F. Uhlir eds., 2003);
Bhaven N. Sampat, Patenting and US Academic Research in the 20th Century: The World Before and After
Bayh–Dole, 35 RES. POL’Y 772, 786 (2006); Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 624 (2008).
48 See, e.g., Jon Brodkin, Patent-Waving Boston U. Wins Cash from Apple, Amazon, and Microsoft,
ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 16, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/patent-wavingboston-u-wins-cash-from-apple-amazon-and-microsoft; John Koetsir, Congratulations, Boston
University,
You’re
Now
a
Patent
Troll,
VENTUREBEAT
(July
3,
2013),
http://venturebeat.com/2013/07/03/congratulations-boston-university-youre-now-a-patenttroll.
49 See U.S. Patent No. 5,686,738 (filed Jan. 13, 1995) (claiming priority to an application
filed Mar. 18, 1991); T. Lei et al., Epitaxial Growth of Zinc Blende and Wurtzitic Gallium Nitride Thin
Films on (001) Silicon, 59 APPLIED PHYSICS LETTERS 944, 946 (1991) (noting NSF support for
the invention described in the patent); see also Tim Stoddard, Green Light on Blue Light: Blue Light
Technology Remains BU’s Intellectual Property, B.U. BRIDGE (Dec. 13, 2002),
https://www.bu.edu/bridge/archive/2002/12-13/bluelight.htm (explaining why B.U. has
patent rights to the blue LED based on this 1991 publication, even though another scientist,
Shuji Nakamura, typically receives scientific credit—as he did in receiving the 2014 Nobel
Prize in Physics).
45
46
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patent does not seem to have been necessary to make blue LEDs publicly
available. A similar conclusion applies to several high-profile inventions in the
biological sciences. Stanford’s widely licensed (and now expired) Cohen–Boyer
patents on recombinant DNA technology—a foundation of the modern
biotechnology industry—are often cited as an example of inventions that did
not need patents for commercialization.50 As another example, a report on ten
genetic diagnostic tests requested by the Department of Health and Human
Services found that in no case “was the test developed by the exclusive rights
holder the first to market.”51 This included the test covered by the (now invalid)
breast cancer gene patent owned by the University of Utah, the United States,
and Myriad Genetics.52 The research underlying this patent was financed in
part by grants from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and intramural
research at the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences.53
When a product would have been invented even without the prospect
of a patent and would have been commercialized even without exclusivity,
then allowing a patentee to charge a supracompetitive price for the product
might seem like it imposes an unnecessary tax on consumers.54 One of us has
argued that if commercialization theory is the justification for Bayh–Dole
patents, then universities ought to be required to license patents to the party
willing to commit to commercialization for the shortest period of exclusivity so
as to minimize the welfare loss from higher prices.55 If a twenty-year patent life
is not necessary to incentivize investment ex ante and not required for
commercialization ex post, then what possible justification might there be for
allowing exclusivity throughout the full patent term?
We do not claim to have a complete answer to the last question. Quite
likely, many readers will reach the end of this piece and conclude that Bayh–
Dole patent rights should be limited to cases in which exclusivity is necessary
for commercialization. Yet there is one dimension of the Bayh–Dole regime
that our analysis so far has ignored—and, indeed, that the academic literature
on Bayh–Dole has ignored as well. Bayh–Dole patent rights affect not only

50 See, e.g., Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 35; Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1710; Rai &
Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 300; Sampat, supra note 47, at 783; So et al., supra note 13, at 2079.
51 SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOC’Y, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON
PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS 31 n.82 (2010).
52 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)
(invalidating U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995)).
53 See SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOC’Y, supra note 51, at A11; Susan L. Neuhausen et al., Haplotype and Phenotype Analysis of Six Recurrent BRCA1 Mutations in
61 Families: Results of an International Study, 58 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 271, 279 (1996); Donna
Shattuck-Eidens et al., BRCA1 Sequence Analysis in Women at High Risk for Susceptibility Mutations,
278 JAMA 1242, 1250 (1997); Donna Shattuck-Eidens et al., A Collaborative Survey of 80
Mutations in the BRCA1 Breast and Ovarian Cancer Susceptibility Gene, 273 JAMA 535, 541 (1995).
54 For an explanation of how patents act as a “shadow tax” on patented products, see
Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV.
303, 312–14, 371–73 (2013).
55 Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 35.
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consumers in the United States (the focus of the “paying twice” critique) but
also consumers in foreign countries (who have yet to “pay once”). And while
access-to-medicine advocates have drawn attention to Bayh–Dole patenting
activity in the developing world, much less is known about Bayh–Dole activity
in other high-income countries. The following Part explains why patents on
publicly funded research in high-income non-U.S. countries might matter to
the Bayh–Dole debates.

II. The Internalization Theory of Bayh–Dole
To understand the potential benefits of foreign Bayh–Dole patents, we
begin in Section II.A by considering why one might expect underinvestment in
public funding for research grants in first place, and how the Bayh–Dole
regime might offer a partial solution to this problem by allowing the United
States to internalize foreign benefits of publicly funded inventions. Section II.B
considers the mechanisms through which this internalization of foreign benefits
might feed back into direct research spending. Finally, Section II.C discusses
some important caveats to this internalization theory of Bayh–Dole.

A. Bayh–Dole and Global Benefit Internalization
We begin with a simplified model of how policymakers set funding
levels for grants and national laboratories. If the goal of U.S. policymakers is to
maximize U.S. welfare, then they should invest up to the point that the
marginal cost equals the marginal benefit to U.S. citizens (and perhaps U.S.
residents as well). Yet the scientific knowledge that results from this investment
often benefits non-U.S. citizens and non-U.S. residents. If U.S. policymakers
do not consider these non-U.S. benefits, then they will invest in knowledge
subsidies at less than the globally optimal level. To be clear, we are not
claiming that federal grant appropriations are explicitly based on detailed costbenefit analyses, nor are we claiming that U.S. lawmakers always act so as to
maximize national welfare. We adopt the national welfare maximization
assumption—which is standard in the international political economy
literature—as a reasonable first approximation to explain U.S. policy, but we
interrogate and relax this assumption in Section II.B .56
Similarly, if policymakers abroad fail to account for the benefits to
consumers in the United States and other countries when setting their spending
levels for grants and other knowledge subsidies, they will also invest less than
the optimum level. As Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz explains, “[k]nowledge is
a global public good,” and “global public goods provide a central rationale for
See, e.g., Gene M. Grossman & Edwin L.-C. Lai, International Protection of Intellectual Property,
94 AM. ECON. REV. 1635, 1643 (2004). Alternatively, one might begin from the assumption
that lawmakers act to maximize their likelihood of reelection or maximize the expected value
of the benefits flowing from public office. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 22 (1991). In Section II.B, we discuss
in more detail how internalization of foreign benefits might actually affect direct R&D
spending in the United States through a public choice theory model.
56
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international collective action.”57 But there is no comprehensive international
agreement requiring nation-states to support research through public finance
at any particular level. Rather, the solution nation-states have found to the
problem of global underinvestment in technical knowledge is an IP solution.
Most significantly, almost all nation-states have ratified the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which requires
signatories (except least-developed countries) to offer twenty-year patents in “all
fields of technology” to inventors from all other signatory states.58 TRIPS
allows producers of knowledge goods to internalize some of the benefits
resulting from use of those knowledge goods abroad.
Innovation economist Suzanne Scotchmer worried that international
coordination on patents rather than on non-patent incentives leads to “too little
public sponsorship and too much intellectual property” at the domestic level.59
Yet the existence of patent law treaties such as TRIPS may actually help solve
the problem of too little domestic spending on non-patent incentives when
combined with Bayh–Dole regimes. The key to this argument is that Bayh–
Dole allows federal government grantees to obtain patents not only in the
United States, but in foreign jurisdictions as well. In this way, Bayh–Dole
patents allow the United States to internalize some of the benefits that its own
direct public spending on innovation brings to consumers overseas. Foreign
consumers benefit from the inventions generated by federally funded research
at U.S. universities. And when foreign consumers pay supracompetitive prices
on these patented inventions, much of this patent “shadow tax”60 flows back to
the United States. Some of this benefit goes to government labs and public
universities;61 some goes to nonprofit research universities and foundations that
57 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS:
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 308, 320 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999).
In a separate Article, we complicate this account of global knowledge production: We explain
that not all knowledge goods are global public goods and that nation-states may have other
motivations to invest in knowledge production besides increasing the welfare of their own
citizens. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Knowledge Goods and Nation-States, 101
MINN. L. REV. 167 (2016). But we do not dispute that there is a global underinvestment
problem; rather, our analysis simply limits the range of knowledge goods for which this
problem is likely to be severe.
58 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights arts. 27(1), 33, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS]; see Members and Observers of the WTO,
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/org6_map_e.htm
(last updated Nov. 30, 2015) (displaying the 162 World Trade Organization members); Accession
in
Perspective,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/cbt_course_e/c1s1p1_e.htm (last visited Feb.
28, 2016) (noting that WTO members represent over 96% of global GDP and trade);
Responding to Least Developed Countries’ Special Needs in Intellectual Property, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ldc_e.htm (last updated Oct. 16, 2013).
59 See Suzanne Scotchmer, The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties, 20 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 415, 415 (2004).
60 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
61 In 2014, six of the top ten universities ranked by life sciences licensing income were
public universities. See Brady Huggett, Top US Universities, Institutes for Life Sciences in 2014, 33
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1131 (2015).
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the federal government has chosen to support through tax exemptions; and
some goes to U.S. manufacturers like Myriad Genetics (and then to the U.S.
government through taxation of these profits).
As noted above, the Bayh–Dole Act even incorporates an explicit
preference for keeping profits within the United States.62 Thus, for example,
the University of Utah could not exclusively license its breast cancer gene
patent to a firm that would conduct genetic testing abroad. This limitation
ensured that foreign consumers would have to obtain their tests for breast
cancer gene mutations from a U.S. firm (or, at least, a firm with a substantial
presence in the United States).

B. The Relationship Between Bayh–Dole Patents and
Direct R&D Spending
While it seems clear that Bayh–Dole serves a benefit-internalization
function, it is less obvious how this feature affects the overall amount of direct
research funds within the United States.63 We hypothesize two plausible
mechanisms through which such funding may be increased: (1) greater support
from internal university research funds generated from Bayh–Dole patent
revenues, and (2) higher federal grant appropriations.
First, Bayh–Dole patentees are required to reinvest patent revenues in
science research and education.64 Successful university technology transfer
offices have been able to recycle significant revenues back into new university
projects. For example, the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (the
independent licensing arm of the University of Wisconsin at Madison) boasts of
providing an inflation-adjusted total of “$2.3 billion in cumulative direct
grants.”65 At Stanford, excess licensing revenue is transferred to the “Research
Incentive Fund” to support early-stage projects by junior science faculty;66 this
fund received over $10 million in the 2013 to 2014 academic year.67
To be sure, many universities do not generate much (if any) net income
from their technology transfer programs,68 and we are not aware of any data
that separates foreign patent revenues from domestic income. It is therefore

Supra note 34 and accompanying text.
For our purposes, it makes little difference whether such funding is recycled through the
federal budget or not. If universities receive additional revenues from Bayh–Dole patents and
that are reinvested in research, this is functionally equivalent to a tax on Bayh–Dole patent
revenues that is returned to universities for new research projects.
64 Supra note 33 and accompanying text.
65 Frequently Asked Questions About WARF’s Purpose and Functions, supra note 21.
66 See OTL and the Inventor: Roles in Technology Transfer, STAN. OFFICE TECH. LICENSING,
http://otl.stanford.edu/inventors/resources/inventors_otlandinvent.html (last visited Mar. 17,
2016); Leveraging Today’s Royalties for Tomorrow’s Research, STAN. TECH. BRAINSTORM (Spring
2006), http://otl.stanford.edu/about/brainstorm/1202_leveraging.html.
67 STANFORD UNIV. OFFICE OF TECH. LICENSING, RISKY BUSINESS: ANNUAL REPORT
2013/14, at 14 (2014).
68 See Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 35 (surveying the literature on Bayh–Dole revenues).
62
63
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difficult to evaluate how successful this “revenue recycling” hypothesis is in
practice. (Though even when legal fees outstrip licensing income, Bayh–Dole
patents may encourage additional grant spending; lawyers are often successful
lobbyists.) What we can say, based on annual survey data from the Association
for University Technology Managers (AUTM), is that the gross licensing
income reported by U.S. universities and nonprofit research institutes has been
increasing faster than their legal fees, as illustrated in Figure 1.69 The trajectory
for net income that can be reinvested into university research thus appears
positive. And at least some universities, such as Wisconsin and Stanford, have
long been recycling their patent revenues—likely including foreign patent
revenues—back into their research programs.
Figure 1. Licensing Income and Legal Fees at U.S. Universities and Nonprofits
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Furthermore, these licensing revenues do not include damages awards
from patent infringement lawsuits brought by universities. For patent lawsuits
filed between 2006 and 2009 with a U.S. university as a party, total damages
awarded were over $3 billion.70 More recently, university patent litigants have
won impressive damages awards, such as the Wisconsin Alumni Research
Statistics Access for Technology Transfer (STATT) Database, supra note 44. The number of U.S.
institutions reporting this data ranged from 157 to 192 over the years shown. AUTM also
surveys Canadian institutions, but they were removed before the cumulative numbers reported
in Figure 1 were calculated.
One estimate concluded from the 2012 AUTM survey data that 84% of reporting
universities did not generate enough licensing income to cover their operating costs. WALTER
D. VALDIVIA, UNIVERSITY START-UPS: CRITICAL FOR IMPROVING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
9 (Ctr. for Tech. Innovation at Brookings, 2013).
70 We conducted a search on August 29, 2016, at LEX MACHINA, http://lexmachina.com.
Of course, large portions of these rewards likely went to university licensees and to the lawyers
litigating the cases, rather than to university coffers.
69
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Foundation’s $234 million award against Apple (appeal pending),71 and
Carnegie Mellon University’s $1.5 billion award against Marvell
Semiconductor (reduced to $750 million in a settlement).72 These lawsuits do
not seem to have much connection to commercialization of the underlying
technologies, but if large portions of these rewards are recycled into new
research projects, the net welfare effect may well be positive. To be clear, given
the confidential nature of most university patent license agreements and
litigation fee arrangements, it is difficult to draw any strong conclusions.
Rather, we hope our argument will encourage universities to analyze and share
their own data so that this claim may be evaluated more rigorously.
The second mechanism through which the internalization function of
Bayh–Dole might increase grant-funded U.S. research is through higher grant
appropriations from Congress. Because their constituents benefit from Bayh–
Dole patents filed abroad, lawmakers interested in increasing U.S. welfare may
have a greater incentive to invest public funds in research in the first place. If
the United States invests up to the point that the marginal cost of research
spending equals the expected marginal benefit within the United States, then
bringing the marginal U.S. benefit per unit of investment closer to the marginal
global benefit will also increase U.S. investment closer to the global optimum.73
Of course, the assumption that Congress will provide funding for
scientific research up to the point that the marginal cost equals the marginal
benefit to U.S. citizens is an oversimplification—even observers with a highly
optimistic view of legislators’ motives would concede as much. And yet the
hypothesis remains plausible even if one adopts a more cynical view of
congressional action. Public choice theory suggests that members of Congress
will support federal funding for scientific research so long as the political
benefits (in particular, the benefits to well-organized interest groups) exceed the
political costs (in the form of higher taxes).74 Interest-group support for federal
research spending will be stronger when well-organized domestic constituencies
stand to profit from federally funded inventions. Universities have successfully
See Andrew Chung, Apple Ordered To Pay $234 Million to University for Infringing Patent,
REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-patent-defenseidUSKCN0SA20E20151016.
72 See Susan Decker, Marvell Technology To Pay $750 Million to Carnegie Mellon, 91 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 1126 (Feb. 19, 2016); Joe Mullin, Chipmaker Hopes to
Overturn Largest Patent Verdict Ever: $1.5 Billion, ARSTECHNICA (Apr. 10, 2015),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/04/chipmaker-hopes-to-overturn-largest-patentverdict-ever-1-5-billion.
73 This logic should be familiar from any course in introductory economics. See, e.g., PAUL
KRUGMAN ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS 266–67 (2d ed. 2010). The other common
solution from introductory economics for underinvestment in goods that produce positive
externalities is a Pigouvian subsidy: a government payment to increase supply of the good. See,
e.g., id. at 275. But there is no global mechanism for subsidizing governments that invest in
knowledge goods; rather, the only comprehensive international coordination mechanism for
knowledge-good production is the system of IP treaties. See generally Hemel & Ouellette, supra
note 57 (discussing this puzzle).
74 See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel, The President’s Power To Tax, 102 CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2773329.
71
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lobbied both for increased research appropriations75 and against any
curtailment of their patent rights.76 Moreover, many of the beneficiaries of
federally funded research (even research that occurs at universities) are privatesector firms such as faculty spinoffs,77 which may be capable of influencing
lawmakers through more traditional methods (e.g., political contributions).
This is not to suggest that interest-group politics will produce an outcome in
which public funding for scientific research exactly equals the national-welfaremaximizing amount. It is to suggest, though, that the amount of funding seems
likely to be positively correlated with domestic benefits, even if the correlation
is far from perfect.78
We will discuss numerous caveats to this account in the following
Section, but first, a concrete example may help illustrate the basic case.
Suppose Congress is debating how much to appropriate to the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) for scientific research related to energy
efficiency,79 which may lead to inventions such as cheaper methods of sealing
wasteful leaks in building air ducts.80 If these inventions could not be
patented,81 then consumers in other countries could free-ride off the ductsealing knowledge that stems from DOE-funded research. If members of
Congress are focused on benefits to only their constituents, they will not
account for these benefits outside the United States when setting DOE’s
75 See Rick Cohen, Universities Pay Plenty for Influence and Access Through Lobbying, NONPROFIT
Q. (July 16, 2014), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2014/07/16/universities-pay-plenty-forinfluence-and-access-through-lobbying.
76 See, e.g., Joe Mullin, How the Patent Trolls Won in Congress, ARSTECHNICA (May 23, 2014),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/how-the-patent-trolls-won-in-congress (noting
that universities succeeded first in winning a carve-out from a bill targeting patent trolls and
then in helping to kill the bill entirely).
77 On faculty spinoffs, see Andy Lockett et al., The Creation of Spin-off Firms at Public Research
Institutions: Managerial and Policy Implications, 34 RES. POL’Y 981 (2005).
78 To be sure, it is conceivable that federal funding for scientific research may be negatively
correlated with Bayh–Dole patent rents reaped by universities. Perhaps lawmakers will look at
the additional revenues that Bayh–Dole brings to universities and decide to reduce the amount
of federal grants commensurately. Yet even in that scenario, the Bayh–Dole regime would
serve a benefit-internalization function: by replacing taxpayer dollars with foreign licensing
fees, Bayh–Dole would be reducing the burden that science research spending places on the
federal fisc. Put differently, if Bayh–Dole leads to foreign consumers paying for research that
would otherwise be funded by taxpayer dollars, then Bayh–Dole—by ensuring that foreign
consumers pay once—results in U.S. taxpayers paying less.
79 Currently, the DOE Office of Science receives over $5 billion per year. Budget, U.S.
DEP’T OF ENERGY OFFICE OF SCI., http://science.energy.gov/budget (last visited Mar. 4,
2016).
80 See U.S. Patent No. 5,522,930 col. 1 l. 5–9 (filed Nov. 4, 1994) (noting support from the
U.S.
Department
of
Energy);
see
also
Duct
Sealing,
ENERGY
STAR,
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=home_improvement.hm_improvement_ducts (last
visited Mar. 4, 2016) (“In a typical house . . . about 20 to 30 percent of the air that moves
through the duct system is lost due to leaks, holes, and poorly connected ducts. The result is
higher utility bills and difficulty keeping the house comfortable, no matter how the thermostat
is set.”).
81 For example, suppose that DOE adopts the market test proposed in Ayres & Ouellette,
supra note 35, and firms prove eager to commercialize these inventions without exclusivity.
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research budget. At the margin, there may be some energy-related research
projects that would not be funded even though they are welfare enhancing
from a global perspective.
Bayh–Dole allows DOE grant recipients to patent these inventions
abroad so that some of the benefits to consumers in other countries flow back
to the United States. Imagine (though the example is far from imaginary) that a
DOE-funded U.C. Davis professor creates a new duct-sealing method and the
University of California’s technology transfer office obtains a patent on this
invention in the United States and in foreign jurisdictions.82 The University of
California then licenses its worldwide patent rights to Aeroseal, Inc., a startup
company created to commercialize the technology.83 Aeroseal, in turn, licenses
the technology to dealers across the United States, Canada, and 19 other
countries.84 Dealers reap profits from their customers; Aeroseal reaps profits
from the dealers; and the University of California reaps profits from Aeroseal.
Bayh–Dole makes this possible by allowing the University of California to
patent the duct-sealing technology: if anyone could use the technology, then
the dealers would have no incentive to pay Aeroseal and Aeroseal would have
no incentive to pay the University of California.
The key point is that Bayh–Dole patents allow U.S. universities to earn
licensing revenues that, at least indirectly, come from the foreign consumers
who benefit from the products of U.S. university research. The profits earned
by the University of California can be redirected back into research. And if
some congressmembers consider these licensing revenues in their own costbenefit calculus, then Congress may increase funding for energy-related
projects. This increased funding is of course a benefit from the perspective of
the grant recipients who share in these patent rents, but it is also a benefit from
a global perspective: if some welfare-enhancing projects that would not have
been pursued without Bayh–Dole are now funded, then consumers worldwide
can benefit from technologies that would otherwise not exist. And note again
that the flow of Bayh–Dole revenue to the University of California may
increase research funding even if the prospect of foreign patent rents does not
affect congressional appropriations choices, because of the revenue-recycling
requirement embedded in the Bayh–Dole statute.85

See Method and Device for Producing and Delivering an Aerosol for Remote Sealing and Coating,
GOOGLE PATENTS, https://patents.google.com/patent/US5522930A (last visited Mar. 9,
2016) (containing links under “Also published as” to parallel patents granted in Europe and
Canada);
Locate
Dealer,
AEROSEAL,
http://www.aeroseal.com/locatedealer/index.php?international (last visited Mar. 4, 2016) (listing distributors of this technology
in eighteen non-U.S. countries).
83 Aeroseal History, AEROSEAL, http://www.aeroseal.com/about-us/history.php (last visited
Mar. 8, 2016).
84
Locate
Dealer:
International,
AEROSEAL,
http://www.aeroseal.com/locatedealer/index.php?international (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
85 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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C. Caveats to the Internalization Theory
The prior two Sections have described the internalization theory of
Bayh–Dole: By allowing the United States to internalize some of the benefits
that foreign consumers receive from publicly funded technologies, Bayh–Dole
may increase grant-funded research within the United States closer to the
globally efficient level that accounts for these external benefits. But there are
important caveats to consider before concluding that this is in fact a significant
net efficiency benefit of the Bayh–Dole regime. Here, we discuss three such
complications: (1) the results of government-funded research cannot always be
patented; (2) investment in some kinds of research grants may not be
suboptimal even without internalization of foreign benefits; and (3) even if
Bayh–Dole yields the internalization benefit that Part III describes, the costs
associated with these patents may not outweigh this benefit.
First, it is worth noting that the benefit we describe is inapplicable to
knowledge that cannot be patented. For example, scholars have identified a
number of medical innovations that are not protectable under most IP laws,
ranging from hygiene checklists for intensive-care units86 to the complex
computational models known as “black-box medicine”87 to information about
failed research projects.88 The Bayh–Dole regime will not help the United
States internalize foreign benefits from its subsidies for these kinds of projects,
and other forms of global coordination may be necessary to prevent
underinvestment. But this observation does not necessarily translate into an
argument against Bayh–Dole patents: when knowledge cannot be patented,
there are no patent-related costs, either. And the fact that Bayh–Dole does not
solve all problems related to underinvestment in non-IP incentives does not
mean that it doesn’t solve some problems.
One might argue that patent protection for knowledge goods that can
be patented negatively affects investment in knowledge goods that cannot be
patented, because capital is diverted from unpatentable technologies to
patentable technologies.89 Yet if capital can move freely across sectors, then
protection for patentable technologies will have only an incidental effect on
investment in unpatentable technologies (insofar as the increased rewards for
investment in patentable technologies boosts the market-wide rate of return
and thus the market-wide cost of capital). Put differently, protection for
patentable technologies will divert capital away from investment in
See Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents,
122 YALE L.J. 1900 (2013).
87 See W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419 (2015). Price
defines “black-box medicine” as “the use of opaque computational models to make decisions
related to health care,” and he explains that the cost-intensive components—aggregated data,
algorithms, and validation studies—generally cannot be protected with patent law. Id. at 421,
443–46.
88 See Sean B. Seymore, The Null Patent, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2041 (2012).
89 See Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 86, at 1945 (“[P]atents may not only fail to incentivize
some net-beneficial goods, but also affirmatively jeopardize the creation of such goods by
diverting resources away from them.”).
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unpatentable technologies to the same extent that it diverts capital away from
investment in any other sector. Patent protection for a new HIV drug reduces
investment in black-box medicine to the same extent that it reduces investment
in shoe factories and sports arenas.
The capital diversion story is compelling only insofar as the factors of
knowledge production are in limited supply. Of course, capital and labor are
always in limited supply, but greater investment in patentable technologies has
at most a rounding-error impact on investment in unpatentable technologies
unless capital and labor are trapped in (and locked out) of the knowledge
sector. This might be true if, say, the number of scientists is fixed (such that
increasing the rewards for science research won’t stop scientists from becoming
traders90) or the availability of venture capital funding is limited (such that
increasing returns to venture capital won’t lead investors to shift over from,
e.g., hedge funds). And yet one can just as easily tell a story in which increasing
the rewards for patentable technologies will lead to greater investment in
unpatentable technologies. To the extent that Bayh–Dole enriches universities,
it results in more money being available for non-federally-funded research
endeavors (including research yielding products that are not protected under
intellectual property laws).
This leads to the second caveat: Internalization of global spillovers is a
benefit only to the extent that there is otherwise a problem with
underinvestment in innovation. This is not necessarily the case in all
circumstances. In the context of domestic IP law, Mark Lemley has argued that
innovators will often have sufficient incentives to create even when others can
free-ride on their discoveries.91 Similarly, in the context of international IP law,
nation-states may have sufficient incentives to subsidize knowledge-good
production even when other states can free-ride on the resulting knowledge. As
we explain in a separate article, not all knowledge goods are global public
goods, and governments have many motivations to invest in knowledge
production that the conventional economic account fails to capture—including
motivations that might take into account foreign benefits.92 And yet the
theoretical underpinnings of the underinvestment hypothesis are strong, and
the existing evidence does little to falsify the hypothesis.93

90 Cf. Landon Thomas Jr., Traders with Ph.D.s, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2016, at B1
(“Harnessing Ph.D.-toting mathematicians to the most powerful computers money can buy has
become the accepted way for hedge funds and banks to get a trading edge these days . . . .”).
91 Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1046–
50 (2005); see also Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257,
276–79 (2007) (making a similar point).
92 Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 57. For example, the United States may receive prestigebased awards from developing solutions to problems like Ebola that primarily afflict developing
countries.
93 See id. (manuscript at 37). Also note that coordination may be required even for some
inframarginal goods: If multiple countries have independent incentives to invest in the same
project, they may strategically choose to wait and hope the others will pursue the project first,
much like the classic game-theory scenario of “chicken.” See id. (manuscript at 48).
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As a final caveat, it is worth noting that even if internalization theory is
an important overlooked benefit of Bayh–Dole patents, this does not mean that
these patents are always welfare enhancing. As others have described at length,
Bayh–Dole patents may have numerous costs, including increased deadweight
loss, transaction costs, and negative changes in the practice and norms of
science.94 These costs are particularly significant if one focuses on patenting on
a global scale, where obtaining and enforcing patent rights is often
prohibitively expensive.95 Even if the Bayh–Dole Act increases direct U.S.
spending on scientific research, this benefit might not outweigh the costs of the
associated patents. This is a specific example of a more general point about IP
laws made by Brett Frischmann and Mark Lemley: “even where internalizing
externalities increases incentives to invest, the social costs of relying on
property rights to do so still may exceed the benefits.”96
Note, though, that Frischmann and Lemley’s argument is quite
different from the “paying twice” critique of Bayh–Dole. The standard
argument for patents is that patents allow for positive externalities to be
internalized; the “paying twice” critique counters that the standard account is
inapplicable in the context of publicly funded research because externalities
have already been internalized. Frischmann and Lemley’s general point casts
doubt on the standard argument at the first step; the internalization theory
casts doubt on the “paying twice” critique at the second step. The two points
are entirely consistent with one another: the social costs of relying on property
rights sometimes exceed the benefits from internalizing positive externalities
and Bayh–Dole sometimes allows the United States to internalize positive
externalities from federally funded research. Of course, if the IP system cannot
be justified on internalization grounds, then neither can Bayh–Dole be. Yet the
standard account of patents—with all the caveats that come with it—applies to
the Bayh–Dole context to a greater extent than exponents of the “paying
twice” critique tend to acknowledge.

III. The Global Reach of U.S. University Patents
So far, we have considered how Bayh–Dole might serve to internalize
foreign benefits in theory; here, we consider the global reach of Bayh–Dole
patents in practice. As noted in the Introduction, access-to-medicines advocates
See Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 35 (reviewing the literature on these costs); Margo A.
Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV.
217 (2006); Rai, supra note 47. Note, though, that the enforcement of Bayh–Dole patents
abroad does not necessarily lead to any deadweight loss, because governments in consumer
states can choose to buy licenses from the patentee and then distribute the relevant knowledge
good to domestic consumers at marginal cost. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 57 (manuscript
at 42–44); Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L.
REV. 998, 1012–13 (2014).
95 See, e.g., MARKETA TRIMBLE, GLOBAL PATENTS: LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL
ENFORCEMENT 35 (2012) (explaining why “obtaining parallel patents is difficult and costly”
and only feasible for large companies).
96 Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 91, at 258.
94
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have raised concerns about the distributive impact university patents on
consumers in low-income countries.97 For example, in advocating for an
“equitable access license” for free use of university technologies in low- and
middle-income countries, Amy Kapczynski, Samantha Chaifetz, Zachary
Katz, and Yochai Benkler have stressed the grave human cost that such patents
might have:
Perhaps patent-based costs account for only a few percent of
preventable deaths from diseases in low- and middle-income
countries. Perhaps open access to university-based technologies
would only avert a fraction of these deaths and free up a
fraction of the research tools relevant to neglected diseases. But
preventing even a fraction of one percent of deaths in low- and
middle-income countries would translate into saving tens of
thousands of lives every year.98
A high-profile example of a university patent that limited access to an
essential medicine abroad is Yale’s South African patent on the AIDS medicine
stavudine (or d4T).99 When Yale and its exclusive licensee decided to permit
the sale of generic stavudine in South Africa, the price dropped from $1600 to
$55 per year.100 There is surprisingly little data, however, about the extent to
which universities in fact seek patents abroad. Was it anomolous for Yale to
patent stavudine in South Africa, or was it in line with typical university patent
acquisition? Kapczynski et al. lamented that “there is no comprehensive data
and no easy way to determine patent status in the majority of [low- or middleincome] countries.”101
Bhaven Sampat took a first cut at this problem in his 2009 study of the
academic patents on new drugs approved by the FDA between 1988 and
2005.102 By examining the U.S. patents that drug companies submit with their
FDA applications, he found seventy-two drugs with at least one academic
patent and ninety-six academic patents in total (due to multiple patents per
drug).103 Using an international patent search tool known as the Derwent
Innovation Index, he concluded that eighteen of these ninety-six patents had
counterparts in low- and middle-income countries—a group that included
India, Brazil, and China.104
Supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
Kapczynski et al., supra note 13, at 1114.
99 Id. at 1034.
100 Id.; see Ouellette, supra note 16, at 309.
101 Kapczynski et al., supra note 13, at 1083.
102 Sampat, supra note 12. His definition of “academic” includes universities, nonprofit
research institutes, government laboratories, and research hospitals, id. at 11, all of which are
subject to the same patent policy considerations we are discussing here.
103 Id. at 11.
104 Id. at 11, 14–15. The full list of countries was India, Kenya, North Korea, Mongolia,
Malawi, Nigeria, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Bulgaria, Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba,
Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Sri Lanka, Morocco, Moldova, Peru, Philippines,
Thailand, Tunisia, and the Ukranian Republic. Id. at 11.
97
98
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While useful for showing that stavudine is not unique, Sampat’s study is
limited to a small set of pharmaceutical inventions, it does not specify which
developing countries those inventions were patented in or whether there were
any patents in low-income countries (as opposed to middle-income countries),
and it does not discuss patenting in any high-income foreign countries. We are
unaware of any other public data on the extent to which U.S. universities have
sought patents abroad.
To shed light on this question, we obtained data from the Economics
and Statistics Division of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), an agency of the United Nations that administers IP treaties and
serves as a reference source for IP information.105 WIPO provided a dataset of
patent filings by U.S. university applicants based on the PATSTAT database,
which is compiled by the European Patent Office (EPO) and which combines
data from over one hundred national and regional patent offices.106 The data
contains counts of the number of distinct patent “families” filed at each patent
office from 2000 to 2011.107 A patent family is a group of patents—in the same
or different countries—that protect a single invention.108 For example, Boston
University sought to protect its blue LED invention with multiple patent
applications in each of the United States, Japan, and the European Patent
Office,109 but in WIPO’s data these would count as one filing for this family in
each of those three jurisdictions.110 If Boston University had instead only
sought to patent this invention in the United States, its three U.S. patents on
this invention would count as one patent family filed only in the United
States.111 Families are counted if any of the applicants are U.S. universities as
coded by WIPO; the data thus includes filings made by U.S. universities in
conjunction with other entities such as for-profit firms.
Table 1 shows the number of patent families filed by U.S. universities
from 2000 to 2011 in different jurisdictions, with countries sorted by World
See
generally
Inside
WIPO,
WORLD
INTELLECTUAL
PROP.
ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/index.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2016).
106
PATSTAT, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, https://www.epo.org/searching-forpatents/business/patstat.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2016). 2011 is the last year with complete
data.
107 The year of filing is the date when the first member of the patent family was filed at any
office. For example, if the first filing for a patent family was at the EPO in 2010, then a 2011
filing in that family at India’s patent office would appear as a 2010 filing in India. 2011 is the
last year of the dataset because it is the last year for which subsequent filings dating to that year
should be complete.
108 See Patent Families, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, https://www.epo.org/searching-forpatents/helpful-resources/first-time-here/patent-families.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2016).
109 See Highly Insulating Monocrystalline Gallium Nitride Thin Films, GOOGLE PATENTS,
https://patents.google.com/patent/US5686738A (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (containing links
under “Also published as” to a number of applications with the same “priority” or first filing
date); supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text (discussing this invention).
110 The blue LED patents are not in WIPO’s data because the priority date was 1991.
111 See U.S. Patent No. 5,385,862 (filed Aug. 30, 1993); U.S. Patent No. 5,686,738 (filed
Jan. 13, 1995) (continuation of the application that became the ’862 patent); U.S. Patent No.
6,123,768 (filed May 10, 1996) (continuation of the application that became the ’738 patent).
105
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Bank income groups.112 Next to each country (or regional office) are three
numbers: the raw number of patent families filed by U.S. universities, and that
number expressed as a percentage of the filings at each of the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) and the EPO. It seems unlikely that many U.S.
universities filed patents abroad without seeking to patent the same invention
domestically, so it is reasonable to conclude, for example, that about one-third
of patents filed domestically were also filed at the EPO, and about one-quarter
were also filed in Canada. Note that counting patent filings for Europe is
complicated because applicants may file patents either with directly with a
country’s national patent office or with the European Patent Office, which
simplifies application procedures for thirty-eight member states, some of which
joined mid-way through the period studied.113 We present the national filing
numbers for those European countries with the largest numbers of filings.
Table 1. Patent Families Filed by U.S. Universities from 2000 to 2011
High Income Economies

Filings

% of US

United States

36,943

Europe (total filings)

14,221

European Patent Office

% of EPO

13,175

35.7%

100.0%

Norway (joined EPO Jan. 1, 2008)

287

0.8%

2.2%

United Kingdom

215

0.6%

1.6%

Poland (joined EPO Mar. 1, 2004)

169

0.5%

1.3%

Germany

104

0.3%

0.8%

Czech Republic (joined EPO July 1, 2002)

94

0.3%

0.7%

Hungary (joined EPO Jan. 1, 2003)

86

0.2%

0.7%

195

0.5%

1.5%

Canada

Other National Offices Combined

9,136

24.7%

69.3%

Japan

8,348

22.6%

63.4%

Australia

5,736

15.5%

43.5%

Republic of Korea

4,029

10.9%

30.6%

Israel

1,341

3.6%

10.2%

New Zealand

1,062

2.9%

8.1%

Russian Federation

600

1.6%

4.6%

Hong Kong

450

1.2%

3.4%

112 Country and Lending Groups, WOLRD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/about/countryand-lending-groups (last visited Mar. 17, 2016).
113 See Member states of the European Patent Organisation, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE,
https://www.epo.org/about-us/organisation/member-states.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2016)
(listing the following member states and their dates of accession: Albania, Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland,
France, United Kingdom, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Monaco, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malta,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, San
Marino, Turkey).
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Singapore

237

0.6%

1.8%

Argentina

223

0.6%

1.7%

Uruguay

18

0.0%

0.1%

Chile

12

0.0%

0.1%

Estonia

6

0.0%

0.0%

Luxembourg

2

0.0%

0.0%

Portugal
GCC Member States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudia Arabia, United Arab Emirates)

2

0.0%

0.0%

2

0.0%

0.0%

Upper-Middle Income Economies

Filings

26

% of US

% of EPO

China

5,675

15.4%

43.1%

Mexico

1,765

4.8%

13.4%

Brazil

1,128

3.1%

8.6%

South Africa
Eurasian Patent Organization (Turkmenistan,
Belarus, Tajikistan, Russian Federation,
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz, Armenia,
Moldova)

523

1.4%

4.0%

215

0.6%

1.6%

Malaysia

112

0.3%

0.9%

Peru

48

0.1%

0.4%

Colombia

46

0.1%

0.3%

Costa Rica

39

0.1%

0.3%

Ecuador

27

0.1%

0.2%

Romania

9

0.0%

0.1%

Panama

7

0.0%

0.1%

Dominican Republic

6

0.0%

0.0%

Cuba

4

0.0%

0.0%

Jordan

3

0.0%

0.0%

Tunisia

3

0.0%

0.0%

Belize

2

0.0%

0.0%

Thailand

2

0.0%

0.0%

Algeria

1

0.0%

0.0%

Montenegro

1

0.0%

0.0%

Lower-Middle Income Economies
India
Philippines

Filings

% of US

% of EPO

2,483

6.7%

18.8%

216

0.6%

1.6%

Ukraine

86

0.2%

0.7%

Vietnam

50

0.1%

0.4%

Egypt

39

0.1%

0.3%

Georgia

29

0.1%

0.2%

Morocco

27

0.1%

0.2%

Honduras

6

0.0%

0.0%

Uzbekistan

6

0.0%

0.0%
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El Salvador

5

0.0%

0.0%

Guatemala

2

0.0%

0.0%

Kenya

2

0.0%

0.0%

Nicaragua

1

0.0%

0.0%

Lower-Income Economies
African Regional Intellectual Property Organization
(Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho,
Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda,
São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia,
Zimbabwe)
African Intellectual Property Organization (Benin,
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, Congo, Ivory Coast, Equatorial
Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Comoros)

Filings

% of US

% of EPO

46

0.1%

0.3%

6

0.0%

0.0%

At least three important observations can be drawn from this data:
First, the majority of inventions at U.S. universities—perhaps as many
as two-thirds—do not appear to be patented abroad. Why wouldn’t a
university always file worldwide patents? The main obstacle is cost. As one
benchmark, Stanford’s technology transfer office explains that comprehensive
foreign patent protection can cost over $200,000 due to legal, translation, and
filing fees, and that “under normal circumstances” it does not obtain foreign
protection “unless a licensee is reimbursing patent costs.”114 Foreign patents
can also be more difficult to obtain: the United States gives inventors a oneyear grace period to file a patent application after disclosing their inventions
(such as at a conference or in a paper),115 but such a disclosure will destroy
patentability in most other countries.116
Second, although U.S. universities do not seek foreign patents on a
majority of their patentable inventions, they do file many patent applications
abroad. The sum of all foreign patent families sought over this twelve-year
period is 72,370—almost twice the 36,943 patent families sought in the United
States. This does not mean that more inventions are patented by U.S.
universities abroad than at home; rather, it means that for each patent family
filed by a university in the United States, the university files—on average—a
family in two more jurisdictions.

114 The Patent Approach of Stanford’s OTL, STANFORD OFFICE OF TECH. LICENSING,
http://otl.stanford.edu/inventors/resources/inventors_patapp.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2016)
(noting that “foreign patent protection can cost $200K or more” and that “under normal
circumstances” Stanford does not seek foreign patent protection unless a licensee is
reimbursing patent costs)
115 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (2012).
116 See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., CERTAIN ASPECTS OF NATIONAL/REGIONAL
PATENT
LAWS:
GRACE
PERIOD
(Nov.
2015),
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/scp/en/national_laws/grace_period.pdf.
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Third, perhaps unsurprisingly, the number of patents filed in a given
foreign jurisdiction correlates strongly with the size and strength of the local
economy. U.S. universities sought 59,750 patent families in high-income
economies, 9,616 in upper-middle income economies, 2,952 in lower-middle
income economies, and only 52 in low-income economies. And almost all of
the patenting outside of high-income economies is in four large upper-middleincome economies—China (5,675), Mexico (1,765), Brazil (1,128), and South
Africa (523)—and one large lower-middle-income economy, India (2,483). No
other country outside the high-income world received more than 1% of
USPTO filings. While these five countries have significant poverty, they also
have large economies: China has the second-highest gross national income in
the world, India is seventh, Brazil is eighth, Mexico is fifteenth, and South
Africa is thirty-first.117
These patent applications in middle- and low-income countries are
worthy of further study, both to examine universities’ rationales for seeking
patents in these jurisdictions and to determine the extent to which these patents
are limiting access to poor consumers.118 But while developing-world patents
have been the focus of the literature on Bayh–Dole’s impact abroad, note that
most foreign patents sought by U.S. universities are in other rich-world
countries. More patent families were filed in each of Europe, Canada, Japan,
and Australia than in the middle-income countries discussed above. Given that
the former economies more closely mirror that of the United States, we think
most readers will find it less objectionable on distributional grounds—and
perhaps distributionally desirable—to ask consumers in these jurisdictions to
pay for some of the benefits they receive from technologies funded by U.S.
taxpayers.
With a more complete picture of how often universities seek patent
protection in foreign jurisdictions, we turn in Part IV to the implications of
these patents for the debate over Bayh–Dole regimes.

IV. Rethinking Bayh–Dole Theory and Practice
What does internalization theory mean for the Bayh–Dole Act? As
noted above, this was not the theory under which Bayh–Dole was enacted.119
And like commercialization theory, internalization theory cannot justify the
Act’s present scope, even under the most optimistic account. Recognizing the
potential internalization benefit, however, has at least four payoffs for the
ongoing debates over Bayh–Dole patents. This Part explains how
internalization theory might affect discussions of (1) Bayh–Dole Act reform in
117
GNI,
Atlas
Method
(Current
US$),
WORLD
BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.ATLS.CD (last visited Aug. 29, 2016) (sorting
by 2015 data).
118 It is not necessarily true that such patents limit access; in theory, they could encourage
investment in local development costs. See generally KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 136–41 (2000).
119 See supra notes 38–39.
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the United States; (2) whether other countries should adopt similar frameworks;
(3) how international trade law should view these regimes; and (4) whether
Bayh–Dole regimes are problematic from the perspective of global distributive
justice.
First, to evaluate the impact of internalization theory on the Bayh–Dole
reform debate in the United States, consider those patents that cannot be
justified under commercialization theory. We have argued that an overlooked
benefit of allowing U.S. research institutions to patent inventions stemming
from federal funding is that such patents allow the United States to internalize
some of the benefits that foreign consumers have received from these
inventions. But note that this benefit applies only to patents filed abroad—it
does nothing to justify the U.S. patents filed by these institutions, or the
associated lawsuits. Perhaps the clearest implication of the internalization
theory is that in some cases, U.S. lawmakers might consider limiting Bayh–
Dole’s scope to foreign patents.120 To be sure, this kind of split Bayh–Dole
implementation might raise practical challenges if arbitrageurs can buy goods
in the United States at marginal cost and then sell them abroad to undercut the
higher prices of patented goods.121 In most high-income countries, however,
patentees can block parallel imports, thus limiting the extent of arbitrage.122
A Bayh–Dole regime that applied only to foreign patenting would not
prevent some consumers from paying twice—specifically, U.S. citizens who
pay federal income taxes but live overseas. This category encompasses several
million people (just how many million is not clear123). Most readers will agree
that this problem—while real—is not so serious as to undermine the case for a
modified Bayh–Dole regime that focuses on foreign patents. Insofar as U.S.
citizens living abroad are unfairly disadvantaged, the problem could be
corrected through tax law (e.g., a deduction or credit for out-of-pocket
spending on patented products generated by federally funded research and
purchased abroad). Our intuition is that the administrative costs of such a fix
would be high relative to whatever fairness benefits it might bring. In any
Cf. Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 35 (noting that if the internalization theory advocated
here is correct, then the “market test” proposal might be limited to domestic patents).
121 See generally Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Trade and Tradeoffs: The Case of
International Patent Exhaustion, 116 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 17 (2016) (discussing the economics
of parallel imports).
122 See Carsten Fink, Entering the Jungle of Intellectual Property Rights: Exhaustion and Parallel
Importation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT 171, 174 (Carsten Fink & Keith
Maskus eds., 2005). In Japan, parallel imports are allowed unless the patentee provides notice
to the contrary. Id. In the United States, the en banc Federal Circuit just rejected an invitation
to adopt an international patent exhaustion regime. Lexmark Int’l Inc. v. Impression Prods.,
Inc., Nos. 14-1617, 2014-1619, 2016 WL 559042 (Feb. 12, 2016).
123 Estimates of the number of U.S. citizens living overseas range from 2.2 million to 8.7
million. See Joe Costanzo & Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels, Counting the Uncountable:
Overseas
Americans,
MIGRATION
INFO.
SOURCE
(May
17,
2013),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/counting-uncountable-overseas-americans; By the
Numbers,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
STATE,
BUREAU
OF
CONSULAR
AFFAIRS,
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/travel/CA%20by%20the%20Numbers%20May%202015.pdf (last updated Apr. 2015).
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event, the question of how to treat U.S. taxpayers living overseas strikes us as a
second-order consideration in the broader Bayh–Dole debate.
Second, although we have framed the internalization theory as a
justification for the U.S. Bayh–Dole Act, a similar argument applies to other
countries considering the adoption of Bayh–Dole-like regimes.124 Just as the
Bayh–Dole Act allows the United States to internalize some of the benefits to
consumers in other countries resulting from U.S. taxpayer-funded research,
Bayh–Dole analogues abroad allow taxpayers in other countries that provide
public support for the production of global knowledge goods to internalize
some of the benefits that their investment yields for U.S. consumers. As we
have emphasized elsewhere, the international IP regime provides a framework
for allocating the cost of knowledge good production across borders.125
Domestic laws that allow for the patenting of government-financed research
are one element within that larger framework.
Indeed, the internalization theory seems to apply with even more force
in other high-income countries with smaller populations than the United
States, such as Norway or Switzerland. Although these two countries have
among the highest gross national incomes per capita in the world,126 they each
represent less than one percent of cumulative global income.127 The United
States, in contrast, produces nearly a quarter of global income, so far more of
the global benefit of any investment in knowledge production is already
internalized.128 If Norway and Switzerland invested in direct science funding
only up to the point that the marginal cost equaled the marginal benefit to
their own citizens—without any ability to internalize benefits to foreign
consumers from their science investments—then these countries would have
weak incentives to become major players in global knowledge good production.
Bayh–Dole-like regimes in small rich-world countries may play a significant
role in bringing these countries’ science investments closer to the global
optimum.
Third, even though domestic manufacture provisions might seem like
the result of protectionist rent-seeking by U.S. industry, the overlooked benefit
we have highlighted might inform how such provisions are viewed under
international trade law. The domestic manufacture provisions of the U.S.
Bayh–Dole Act were challenged by Brazil in 2001 as a violation of various
requirements of treaties administered by the World Trade Organization
(WTO).129 Brazil ultimately suspended this challenge as part of settlement, such
124 On international analogues to Bayh-Dole, see generally David C. Mowery & Bhaven N.
Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and University-Industry Technology Transfer: A Model for Other
OECD Governments?, 30 J. TECH. TRANSFER 115 (2005).
125 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 57 (manuscript at 37–42).
126 See GNI Per Capita, Atlas Method (Current US$), supra note 18 (ranking Norway and
Switzerland first and third in terms of gross national income per capita).
127 See GNI, Atlas Method (Current US$), supra note 117.
128 See id.
129 Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States—US Patents Code, WT/DS224/1 (Feb.
7, 2001), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds224_e.htm.
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that the WTO never had an opportunity to evaluate the merits of Brazil’s
claims.130 Evaluating the legal status of domestic manufacture provisions under
international trade law is beyond the scope of this piece; we simply note that as
a practical matter, domestic manufacture provisions may serve as mechanisms
for benefit internalization rather than pure protectionism.
Finally, we suggest that our analysis highlights an overlooked
distributive implication of the Bayh–Dole regime. The argument against Bayh–
Dole from a global distributive justice perspective is that Bayh–Dole enriches
already well-endowed U.S. universities at the expense of foreign consumers—
including consumers in the very least developed countries. It is easy to see why
one might object to a regime that results in transfers from consumers in Burundi
and Malawi to the coffers of Stanford and MIT. Yet the critique of Bayh–Dole
on global distributive justice grounds is not as straightforward as it might
initially seem. In a hypothetical scenario in which Congress repealed or
curtailed Bayh–Dole and required universities to license the products of
federally funded research on a nonexclusive basis worldwide, consumers in
Burundi and Malawi would benefit—but so too would their counterparts in
Luxembourg and Norway (countries in which per capita gross domestic
product is considerably higher than in the United States).131 Repealing Bayh–
Dole is an extremely scattershot way of addressing global wealth inequality, as
the benefits would flow not only to consumers in the world’s poorest countries
but also to consumers in the world’s richest.
We are sympathetic to the argument that the United States should
redistribute more of its wealth to the world’s poor. We are less persuaded that
this argument counts as a strike against Bayh–Dole. If the motivation for
curtailing Bayh–Dole is that the United States should redistribute more of its
wealth to the world’s poor, then the more logical conclusion is that the United
States should preserve Bayh–Dole and redistribute more of its wealth to the
world’s poor via foreign aid. To be sure, advocates of increased foreign aid face
considerable political obstacles. But so too do critics of Bayh–Dole. The
relevant question is whether, in a scenario in which the political will for Bayh–
Dole repeal or significant scale-back exists, the political will for retention of
Bayh–Dole plus a substantial increase in the foreign aid budget would also
exist. Note that the benefits of Bayh–Dole are relatively concentrated (with the
pharmaceutical industry and the higher education sector being the most
notable winners) while the costs of foreign aid spending are diffuse (spread
across all taxpayers). Standard public choice logic would suggest that repealing
or significantly scaling back Bayh–Dole may be politically more difficult than
keeping Bayh–Dole and increasing foreign aid. Advocates of global wealth
redistribution who now target Bayh–Dole might consider resetting their sights.

See Keith E. Maskus, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 408 (Amrita Narlikar et al. eds., 2012) (noting that
the United States withdrew its WTO complaint about Brazil’s local-working requirement
based in part on Brazil’s agreement “to suspend its counter-dispute against the United States”
regarding the Bayh–Dole Act’s domestic manufacture provision).
131 For arguments that the Bayh–Dole Act should be repealed, see supra note 8.
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For these reasons, advocates of global wealth redistribution (and we
consider ourselves members of this camp) might consider the possibility of
pursuing redistributive objectives within the Bayh–Dole framework rather than
arguing for Bayh–Dole repeal or reform on (shaky) distributional grounds. One
possibility is to allow federal government grantees to pursue patent protect in
other rich-world countries but not in the least developed ones. In fact, such a
change might not amount to a dramatic deviation from the status quo. As
noted above, U.S. universities are much more likely to seek patent protection
under the laws of industrialized nations than under the laws of the least
developed countries.
Additionally, universities (perhaps spurred by access-focused activists
within university communities132) may be able to use their patents as leverage
to help rather than hurt consumers in poorest countries.133 Over one hundred
universities and other nonprofit institutions have declared that “responsible
[patent] licensing includes consideration of the needs of people in developing
countries and members of other underserved populations,”134 and a smaller
group has more recently articulated specific ways in which they are
“committed to implementing effective technology transfer strategies that
promote the availability of health-related technologies in developing
countries.”135 Access-to-medicine objectives might be better achieved by
having universities take an active role in the allocation of knowledge goods
across borders, rather than by having universities exit the arena entirely and
allow patents to become the province of the private sector alone.

For example, the group Universities Allied for Essential Medicines issues an annual
report card that grades universities on their global health impact, including their patent
policies. University Report Card: Global Equity & Biomedical Research, UNIV. ALLIED FOR ESSENTIAL
MED., http://globalhealthgrades.org (last visited Aug. 29, 2016).
133 See Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917 (2009)
(describing the role of noncommercial, humanitarian norms in university patenting);
Kapczynski et al., supra note 13; Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Comment, Addressing the Green Patent
Global Deadlock Through Bayh–Dole Reform, 119 YALE L.J. 1727 (2010); Ouellette, supra note 16. As
one example, Johns Hopkins University recently reached an agreement with the Medicines
Patent Pool to offer a royalty-free license to its patent with Pfizer on the tuberculosis drug
sutezoid. See Press Release, Medicines Patent Pool, The Medicines Patent Pool Announces
First
Licence
for
Tuberculosis
Treatment
(Jan.
25,
2017),
http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/the-medicines-patent-pool-announces-first-licence-fortuberculosis-treatment.
134 CAL. INST. OF TECH. ET AL., IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: NINE POINTS TO CONSIDER IN
LICENSING
UNIVERSITY
TECHNOLOGY
(2007),
http://www.autm.net/AUTMMain/media/Advocacy /Documents/Points_to_Consider.pdf.
For a list of institutions that have signed the Nine Points, see Nine Points to Consider, ASS’N. OF
UNIV.
TECH.
MANAGERS,
http://www.autm.net/advocacy-topics/governmentissues/principles-and-guidelines/nine-points-to-consider-when-licensing-university (last visited
Jan. 21, 2016).
135 ASSN UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS ET AL., STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND STRATEGIES
FOR
THE
EQUITABLE DISSEMINATION OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES (2009),
http://otd.harvard.edu/upload/files/Global_Access_Statement_of_Principles.pdf.
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Conclusion
Our contribution here is both theoretical and empirical. In theory, the
Bayh–Dole Act and its overseas analogues can allow nation-states that produce
global knowledge goods to capture a share of the benefits that their investments
yield for consumers abroad. This feature plausibly encourages further public
spending on scientific research, though we are the first to acknowledge that this
effect is as yet unproven. What we can and do show here is that U.S.
universities file a significant number of Bayh–Dole patents abroad—primarily
in high-income countries and a handful of upper-middle-income countries,
though rarely in lower-middle-income countries aside from India and almost
never in the lowest-income countries. The primary effect of the Bayh–Dole Act
beyond the United States’ borders is to allow U.S. taxpayer-funded research
institutions to claim a share of the benefits that their efforts yield for consumers
elsewhere in the rich world.
Does this account immunize Bayh–Dole from critics who charge that it
forces U.S. consumers to “pay twice” for innovations and that the Act’s
commercialization benefits are overstated? Certainly not. But it does suggest an
added and as-yet-overlooked dimension to the Bayh–Dole debate. Our modest
conclusion is that supporters and critics of Bayh–Dole alike ought to consider
the Act’s role within the broader framework of policies allocating the costs of
knowledge good production across borders. While it is too soon to say that
Bayh–Dole deserves a place within that framework, we also think that the
contrary conclusion is likewise premature.

